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Abstract- Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) has 
mostly gained the attention of today’s research efforts, 
while current solutions to achieve secure VANET, to 
protect the network from adversary and attacks still not 
enough,  trying to reach a satisfactory level, for the driver 
and manufacturer to achieve safety of life and 
infotainment. The need for a robust VANET networks is 
strongly dependent on their security and privacy features, 
which will be discussed in this paper. 
In this paper a various types of security problems and 
challenges of VANET been analyzed and discussed; we 
also discuss a set of solutions presented to solve these 
challenges and problems. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent year’s rapid development in wireless 
communication networks has made Inter-Vehicular 
Communications (IVC) and Road-Vehicle 
Communications (RVC) possible in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs), this has given birth to a new type 
of MANET known as the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network 
(VANET), aiming to enable road safety, efficient 
driving, and infotainment. 
The world today is living a combat, and the battle field 
lies on the roads, the estimated number of deaths is 
about 1.2 million people yearly worldwide [15], and 
injures about forty times of this number, without 
forgetting that traffic congestion that makes a huge 
waste of time and fuel [1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET) is part of Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks (MANET), this means that every 
node can move freely within the network coverage and 
stay connected, each node can communicate with other 
nodes in single hop or multi hop, and any node could be 
Vehicle, Road Side Unit (RSU). 
In the year 1998, the team of engineers from Delphi 
Delco Electronics System and IBM Corporation 
proposed a network vehicle concept aimed at providing 
a wide range of applications [14]. With the 
advancements in wireless communications technology, 
the concept of network car has attracted the attention all 
over the world. 
In recent years, many new projects have been launched, 
targeting on realizing the dream of networking car and 
successful implementation of vehicular networks. The 
project Network On Wheels (NOW) [3] is a German 
research project founded by DaimlerChrysler AG, 
BMW AG, Volkswagen AG, Fraunhofer Institute for 
Open Communication Systems, NEC Deutschland 
GmbH and Siemens AG in 2004, The project adopts an 
IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless access, The main 
objectives of this project are to solve technical issues 
related to communication protocols and data security for 
car-to-car communications. The Car2Car 
Communication Consortium [16] is initiated by six 
European car manufacturers. Its goal is to create a 
European industrial standard for car-to-car 
communications extend across all brands. FleetNet [16] 
was another European program which ran from 2000 to 
2003 this ad hoc research was dominated by efforts to 
standardize MANET protocols, and this MANET 
research focused on the network layer[2], the ultimate 
challenge was to solve the problem of how to reach 
nodes not directly within radio range by employing 
neighbors as forwarders, while the European 
Commission is pushing for a new research effort in this 
area in order to reach the goal of reducing the car 
accidents of 50% by 2010, aiming to reach a 
satisfactory level of secure VANET. 
The radio used for the communication is Dedicated 
Short-Range Communications (DSRC), which been 
 
 Fig. 1 VANET Structure 
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allocated as new band in 1999 by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)[3], the band 
allocated was 75 MHz at 5.9 GHz frequency for 
Intelligent Transport System (ITS) applications in north 
America.  
VANET security should satisfy four goals, it should 
ensure that the information received is correct 
(information authenticity), the source is who he claims 
to be (message integrity and source authentication), the 
node sending the message cannot be identified and 
tracked (privacy) and the system is robust. 
Our paper presents in section 2 an analysis of VANET 
attack and attackers to show the problems that VANET 
facing, in section 3 we analyzed VANET challenges like 
mobility and privacy which considered the hardest 
security problems of VANET, in section 4 we list the 
security requirement that must exist to achieve the 
security system, in section 5 we discussed the current 
solution for the challenges and attacks and requirement 
to achieve a secure system, that been addressed by other 
papers and researchers. 
 
a. HOW VANET WORKS 
Vehicular Networks System consists of large number of 
nodes, approximately number of vehicles exceeding 750 
million in the world today [4], these vehicles will 
require an authority to govern it, each vehicle can 
communicate with other vehicles using short radio 
signals DSRC (5.9 GHz), for range can reach 1 KM, 
this communication is an Ad Hoc communication that 
means each connected node can move freely, no wires 
required, the routers used called Road Side Unit (RSU), 
the RSU works as a router between the vehicles on the 
road and connected to other network devices. 
Each vehicle has OBU (on board unit), this unit 
connects the vehicle with RSU via DSRC radios, and 
another device is TPD (Tamper Proof Device), this 
device holding the vehicle secrets, all the information 
about the vehicle like keys, drivers identity, trip details, 
speed, rout …etc, see figure 1. 
 
II. VANET SECURITY CONCERNS  
VANET suffer from various attacks; these attacks are 
discussed in the following subsections: 
 
A. ATTACKS 
In this paper we are concentrating on attacks perpetrated 
against the message itself rather than the vehicle, as 
physical security is not in the scope of this paper. 
1) Denial of Service attack, 
This attack happens when the attacker takes control of a 
vehicle’s resources or jams the communication channel 
used by the Vehicular Network, so it prevents critical 
information from arriving. It also increases the danger 
to the driver, if it has to depend on the application’s 
information. 
For instance, if a malicious wants to create a massive 
pile up on the highway, it can make an accident and use 
the DoS attack to prevent the warning from reaching to 
the approaching vehicles [1], [5], [6], and [7]. See 
figure 2. 
Authors in [1] discussed a solution for DoS problem and 
saying that the existing solutions such as hopping do not 
completely solve the problem, the use of multiple radio 
transceivers, operating in disjoint frequency bands, can 
be a feasible approach but even this solution will require 
adding new and more equipments to the vehicles, and 
this will need more funds and more space in the vehicle. 
The authors in [12], proposed a solution by switching 
between different channels or even communication 
technologies (e.g., DSRC, UTRA-TDD, or even 
Bluetooth for very short ranges), if they are available, 
when one of them (typically DSRC) is brought down.  
2) Message Suppression Attack, 
An attacker selectively dropping packets from the 
network, these packets may hold critical information for 
the receiver, the attacker suppress these packets and can 
use them again in other time[5]. 
The goal of such an attacker would be to prevent 
registration and insurance authorities from learning 
about collisions involving his vehicle and/or to avoid 
delivering collision reports to roadside access points 
[17]. 
For instance, an attacker may suppress a congestion 
warning, and use it in another time, so vehicles will not 
receive the warning and forced to wait in the traffic. 
3) Fabrication Attack, 
An attacker can make this attack by transmitting false 
information into the network, the information could be 
false or the transmitter could claim that it is somebody 
else. 
This attack includes fabricate messages, warnings, 
certificates, identities [5], [7] [17]. 
4)      Alteration Attack, 
This attack happens when attacker alters an existing 
data, it includes delaying the transmission of the 
information, replaying earlier transmission, or altering 
the actual entry of the data transmitted [5]. 
For instance, an attacker can alter a message telling 
other vehicles that the current road is clear while the 
road is congested [17]. 
5) Replay Attack, 
This attack happens when an attacker replay the 
transmission of an earlier information to take advantage 
of the situation of the message at time of sending [5]. 
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Basic 802.11 security has no protection against replay. It 
does not contain sequence numbers or timestamps. 
Because of keys can be reused, it is possible to replay 
stored messages with the same key without detection to 
insert bogus messages into the system. Individual 
packets must be authenticated, not just encrypted. 
Packets must have timestamps.  
The goal of such an attack would be to confuse the 
authorities and possibly prevent identification of 
vehicles in hit-and-run incidents [17]. 
6) Sybil Attack, 
This attack happens when an attacker creates large 
number of pseudonymous, and claims or acts like it is 
more than a hundred vehicles, to tell other vehicles that 
there is jam ahead, and force them to take alternate 
route[5],[8]. See Figure 3. 
Sybil attack depends on how cheaply identities can be 
generated, the degree to which the system accepts 
inputs from entities that do not have a chain of trust 
linking them to a trusted entity, and whether the system 
treats all entities identically. 
For instance an attacker can pretend and act like a 
hundred vehicle to convince the other vehicles in the 
road that there is congestion, go to another rout, so the 
road will be clear. 
 
B.  ATTACKERS  
1) Selfish Driver, 
The general idea for trust in Vehicular Network is that 
all vehicles must be trusted initially, these vehicles are 
trusted to follow the protocols specified by the 
application, some drivers try to maximize their profit 
from the network, regardless the cost for the system by 
taking advantage of the network resources illegally [5]. 
A Selfish Driver can tell other vehicles that there is 
congestion in the road, so they must choose an alternate 
route, so the road will be clear for it. See figure 4. 
2) Malicious Attacker, 
This kind of attacker tries to cause damage via the 
applications available on the vehicular network. In 
many cases, these attackers will have specific targets, 
and they will have access to the resources of the 
network [1], [5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, a terrorist can issue a deceleration 
warning, to make the road congested before detonating 
a bomb. 
3) Pranksters, 
Include bored people probing for vulnerabilities and 
hackers seeking to reach fame via their damage [5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
For instance, a prankster can convince one vehicle to 
slow down, and tell the vehicle behind it to increase the 
speed.  
 
III. VEHECULAR NETWORKS CHALENGES 
 
1) Mobility 
The basic idea from Ad Hoc Networks is that each node 
in the network is mobile, and can move from one place 
to another within the coverage area, but still the 
mobility is limited, in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
nodes moving in high mobility, vehicles make 
connection throw their way with another vehicles that 
maybe never faced before, and this connection lasts for 
only few seconds as each vehicle goes in its direction, 
and these two vehicles may never meet again. So 
securing mobility challenge is hard problem. 
Fig. 2 DoS Attack 
 
 
Fig. 4 Selfish Driver 
 
Fig. 3 Sybil Attack. 
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There is many researches have addressed this challenge 
[5], [9], but still this problem unresolved.  
2) Volatility 
The connectivity among nodes can be highly ephemeral, 
and maybe will not happen again, vehicles travelling 
throw coverage area and making connection with other 
vehicles, these connections will be lost as each car has a 
high mobility, and maybe will travel in opposite 
direction[1],[5]. 
Vehicular networks lacks the relatively long life context, 
so personal contact of user’s device to a hot spot will 
require long life password and this will be impractical 
for securing VC.  
3) Privacy VS Authentication 
The importance of authentication in Vehicular Ad Hoc 
Networks is to prevent Sybil Attack that been discussed 
earlier [8]. 
To avoid this problem we can give a specific identity for 
every vehicle, but this solution will not be appropriate 
for the most of the drivers who wish to keep their 
information protected and private[1],[5].  
4)  Privacy VS Liability 
Liability will give a good opportunity for legal 
investigation and this data can’t be denied (in case of 
accidents)[1], in other hand the privacy mustn’t be 
violated and each driver must have the ability to keep 
his personal information from others (Identity, Driving 
Path, Account Number for toll Collector etc.). 
5) Network Scalability 
The scale of this network in the world approximately 
exceeding the 750 million nodes [4], and this number is 
growing, another problem arise when we must know 
that there is no a global authority govern the standards 
for this network [1], [5], [7], for example: the standards 
for DSRC in North America is deferent from the DSRC 
standards in Europe, the standards for the GM Vehicles 
is deferent from the BMW one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
6) Bootstrap 
At this moment only few number of cars will be have 
the equipment required for the DSRC radios, so if we 
make a communication we have to assume that there is a 
limited number of cars that will receive the 
communication, in the future we must concentrate on 
getting the number higher, to get a financial benefit that 
will courage the commercial firms to invest in this 
technology [5]. 
 
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
1-  Authentication 
In Vehicular Communication every message must be 
authenticated, to make sure for its origin and to control 
authorization level of the vehicles, to do this vehicles 
will assign every message with their private key along 
with its certificate, at the receiver side, the receiver will 
receive the message and check for the key and 
certificate once this is done, the receiver verifies the 
message [1], [5]. 
Signing each message with this, causes an overhead, to 
reduce this overhead we can use the approach ECC 
(Elliptic Curve Cryptography), the efficient public key 
cryptosystem, or we can sign the key just for the critical 
messages only. 
2. Availability 
Vehicular network must be available all the time, for 
many applications vehicular networks will require real-
time, these applications need faster response from 
sensor networks or even Ad Hoc Network, a delay in 
seconds for some applications will make the message 
meaningless and maybe the result will be 
devastating[1][5].  
Attempting to meet real-time demands makes the system 
vulnerable to the DoS attack. In some messages, a delay 
in millisecond makes the message meaningless; the 
problem is much bigger, where the application layer is 
unreliable, since the potential way to recover with 
unreliable transmission is to store partial messages in 
hopes to be completed in next transmission.  
3. Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation will facilitate the ability to identify the 
attackers even after the attack happens [5], [8]. This 
prevents cheaters from denying their crimes. 
Any information related to the car like: the trip rout, 
speed, time, any violation will be stored in the TPD, any 
official side holding authorization can retrieve this data. 
4. Privacy  
Keeping the information of the drivers away from 
unauthorized observers, this information like real 
identity, trip path, speed etc… 
The privacy could be achieved by using temporary 
(anonymous) keys, these keys will be changed 
frequently as each key could be used just for one time 
and expires after usage [1], all the keys will be stored in 
the TPD, and will be reloaded again in next time that the 
vehicle makes an official checkup [5]. 
Fig. 5: Europe VS North America Standards. 
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For preserving the real identity of the driver, an ELP 
(Electronic License Plate) is used, this license is 
installed in the factory for every new vehicle, it will 
provide an identification number for the vehicle, to 
identify the vehicle in anywhere, with the RFID 
technology to hold the ELP. 
In case when the police or any official wants the real 
identity, it can take an order from the judge to recover 
the identity of specific vehicles ELP. 
5. Real-time constraints 
Vehicles move in high speed, this will require a real-
time response in some situation, or the result will be 
devastating [5]. 
Current plans for vehicular networks rely on the 
emerging standard for dedicated short-range 
communications (DSRC), based on an extension to the 
IEEE 802.11 technology. 
6. Integrity 
Integrity for all messages should be protected to prevent 
attackers from altering them, and message contents to be 
trusted [1]. 
7. Confidentiality 
The privacy of each driver must be protected; the 
messages should be encrypted to prevent outsiders from 
gaining the drivers information [1].  
V. CURRENT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
In VANET many security solutions been proposed, and 
large number of papers were introduced to solve the 
above problems, the authors in [1] and in [7] suggested 
the use of VPKI (Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure) 
as a solution, where each node will have a public/private 
key. When a vehicle sends a safety message, it signs it 
with its own private key and adds the Certificate 
Authority (CA’s) certificate as follows: 
V → r: M, SigPrKV [M|T], Certv [7] 
Where V is the sending vehicle, r represents the 
message receivers, M is the message, | is the 
concatenation operator, and T is the timestamp to ensure 
message freshness (it can be obtained from the security 
device).The receivers of the message will obtain the 
public key of V using the certificate and then verify V’s 
signature using its certified public key. In order to do 
this, the receiver should have the public key of the CA 
[12]; this solution is cited in [3], [5], [10], and [11]. 
Authors in [18]suggested an idea of using the group 
signature, but this idea has a major drawback that it is 
causing a great overhead, every time that any vehicle 
enters the group area, the group public key and the 
vehicle session key for each vehicle that belongs to the 
group must be changed and transmitted, another issue 
must be considered that the mobility of the VANET 
prevents the network from making a static group, so the 
group is changing all the time, and the signatures and 
keys frequently changed and transmitted, group 
signature is also mentioned in [10][19], as the authors 
proposed a protocol for guarantee the requirements of 
the security and privacy, and to provide the desired 
traceability and liability, but the result of the study was 
not quit encouraging, After 9 ms for group signature 
verification delay, the average message loss ratio was 
45%, another result was the loss ratio reaches as high as 
68% when the traffic load is 150 vehicles .   
The other solution been suggested is the use of CA and 
this requires infrastructure for it. VANET requires a 
large number of CA to govern it. until now we don’t 
have a real authority that govern the world of VANET, 
the CA been suggested by[4],[7],[10],[11],[12],[13] , all 
of these researchers mentioned the CA to handle all the 
operations of certificate : generating, renewing and 
revoking, and CA must be responsible in initiating keys, 
storing, managing and broadcasting the CRL. 
Authors in [1] also discussed how to maintain the 
authentication for the message, where vehicles will sign 
each message with their private key and attach the 
corresponding certificate. Thus, when another vehicle 
receives this message, it verifies the key used to sign the 
message and if everything is correct, it verifies the 
message, and they have proposed the use of ECC to 
reduce the overhead as mentioned before in section 4.1, 
while authors in [3] suggested another way to use the 
keys, by using short term certificates and long term, 
long term certificates are used for authentication while 
short term certificates are used for data transmission 
using public/private key cryptography. Safety messages 
are not encrypted as they are intended for broadcasting, 
but their validity must be checked; therefore a source 
signs a message and sends it without encryption with its 
certificate; other nodes receiving the message validate it 
using the certificate and signature and may forward it 
without modification if it is a valid message, so any 
adversary can inject false information as a safety 
message, as it doesn’t to be encrypted, it also can steal 
the certificate from any other safety message and send 
unencrypted message contains false information along 
with the stolen certificate claiming that the safety 
message originated from another vehicle. 
Using VPKI in VANET accompanied with some 
challenges, like certificate of an attacker that must be 
revoked, authors in[1] discussed the Certificate 
Revocation solution, this solution is used to revoke the 
expired certificate to make other vehicles aware of their 
invalidity, and The most common way to revoke 
certificates is the distribution of CRLs (Certificate 
Revocation Lists) that contains all revoked certificates, 
but this method has some drawbacks: First, CRLs can 
be very long due to the enormous number of vehicles 
and their high mobility. Second, the short lifetime of 
certificates still creates a vulnerability window and last 
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one is that there is no infrastructure for the CRL. It is 
also mentioned some protocols for revocations like 
RTPD (Revocation Protocol of the Tamper-Proof 
Device), RCCRL (Revocation protocol using 
Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists), and DRP 
(Distributed Revocation Protocol), these protocols also 
been discussed in details in [4], and been proposed in 
[11], saying that the use of CRL is not appropriate 
anymore and these protocols are better, but these 
methods rely on monitoring, so every vehicle has to 
monitor and detect all the vehicles around it, but this 
method didn’t consider the reputation system, as it is a 
possible for number of adversary vehicles to make an 
accusation and causing of an unnecessary revocation, 
the best result obtained from DRP simulation is that just 
25% if the current road vehicles will receive the 
warning, which is too low. 
Authors in [1] mentioned a solution that will help to 
maintain the privacy by using a set of anonymous keys 
that change frequently (every couple of minutes) 
according to the driving speed. Each key can be used 
only once and expires after its usage; only one key can 
be used at a time. These keys are preloaded in the 
vehicle’s TPD for a long duration; each key is certified 
by the issuing CA and has a short lifetime (e.g., a 
specific week of the year). In addition, it can be traced 
back to the real identity of the vehicle ELP, the 
drawback of this solution that the keys need storage. 
In[3] authors mentioned that In the IEEE WAVE 
standard vehicles can change their IP addresses and use 
random MAC addresses to achieve security, IP version 6 
has been proposed for use in vehicular networks. Cars 
should be able to change their IP addresses so that they 
are not traceable, however it is not clear how this will be 
achieved. 
Moreover this can cause inefficiency in address usage 
since when a new address is assigned the old address 
cannot be reused immediately. Delayed packets will be 
dropped when the car changes its IP address which 
causes unnecessary retransmissions. 
Authors in [5] added another proposed solution by 
making regular inspections, where in most U.S. states 
all vehicles must pass inspection once a year. This 
yearly trip to the mechanic provides interesting 
possibilities for security maintenance in addition to the 
typical maintenance to be performed. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks is promising technology, 
which gives abundant chances for attackers, who will try 
to challenge the network with their malicious attacks. 
This paper gave a wide analysis for the current 
challenges and solutions, and critics for these solutions, 
in our future work we will propose new solutions that 
will help to maintain a securer VANET network, and 
test it by simulation.  
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